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Introduction
This book is a sequel to Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Under­
standing (Lacey 1999/2004; hereafter referred to as SVF). I introduced in SVF a 
general model of the interplay of science and values that enables us to identify 
clearly the ways in which values legitimately play a role in scientific practices 
and the ways in which they do not. I was interested, however, not only in the im­
pact of values on scientific methodology, but also (though this was much less de­
veloped) in how scientific practices and results may have impact in the realm of 
values, in how, for example, science may have implications for and contribute to 
the quest for social justice and human well-being. In this present book, the ques­
tion of how to conduct scientific practices for the sake of furthering human well­
being informs the overall argument.
Part I does deal with questions of scientific methodology. It strengthens some 
of the arguments made in SVF, draws new consequences that flow from the gen­
eral framework concerning how scientific results are to be interpreted, argues for 
the methodological importance of applied science, and deepens arguments in fa­
vor of methodological pluralism by bringing to the forefront questions that must 
be addressed in order to legitimate applications of scientific knowledge—all so 
as to show that the quest for objectivity in science is not incompatible with con­
ducting science for the sake of furthering human well-being. Then, in part II, I 
bring the analysis of methodology developed in part I to bear on a current con­
troversy with far-reaching ethical and social implications: whether transgenic 
crops should be used widely and, if not, what forms of farming provide suitable 
alternatives to using them. Through drawing on this analysis, we gain a rich un­
derstanding of the scientific, ethical, and political dimensions of the controversy 
and of how the dimensions interact with one another. At the same time, all the 
themes of part I are illustrated, especially as they concern the conduct and insti­
tutionalization of scientific practices. Throughout part I, I anticipate various fea-
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tines of the discussion to follow in part II, introducing them where convenient 
from chapter to chapter, in order to illustrate, to stimulate, and to give concrete 
texture to the general philosophy of science being developed; and also in order 
to be in a position to make soundly based recommendations about how to re­
spond to the controversy.
The analysis of the transgenics controversy, in the light of my general model 
of the interplay of science and values, is the most distinctive feature of this book, 
and it is intended to have impact on public discussion. But the argument of the 
book will not be dated when the controversy no longer captures attention, for 
that is not what the book principally is about. It is about my model of the inter­
action of values and scientific practices, and about making sense of science as a 
historical and social phenomenon. It is a test of the explanatory power and sig­
nificance of my model that it makes sense of the actual historical outcome of the 
transgenics controversy, whatever it may be. Another, ultimately more impor­
tant, test is whether the analysis can be generalized to make sense of a wide 
range of scientific developments and controversies, and whether some of the al­
ternative kinds of scientific practices to which the analysis points can be devel­
oped into nourishing areas of research and practice.
SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF 
IS SCIENCE VALUE FREE?
The principal theme of SVF, as its title makes apparent, is the analysis and crit­
ical appraisal of the widely held view that science is value free. In order to lo­
cate the contribution of this book, it will be helpful to recall the central theoret­
ical concepts and to .state the most important conclusions of the earlier book. I 
will do this by presenting a list of the principal theses that were defended in it.
Tliesis 1; The idea that science is value free is best understood as a combination of 
claims about three key aspects of scientific practices—the acceptance of theories and 
the knowledge claims that are represented in them, the consequences of applying sci­
entific knowledge, and scientific methodology—that I call respectively: impartiality, 
neutrality, and autonomy; it is well captured by the thesis; impartiality, neutrality, and 
autonomy are constitutive values of scientific practices and institutions—where, 
among other things, impartiality presupposes that there is a distinction between cog­
nitive and social (ethical and other kinds of non-cognitive) values, and neutrality pre­
supposes that scientific theories have no value judgments among their logical impli­
cations.
This thesis, and the presuppositions of impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy, 
will be re-articulated in a sharper and more elegant manner in chapter 1 of this 
book.
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After extensive argument, I concluded;
Thesis 2: Only impartiality can be unambiguously upheld. It expresses the value: 
to accept a theory of a domain of phenomena if and only if it manifests the cogni­
tive values to a suitably high degree in the light of relevant available empirical data, 
and to reject a theory if and only if it is inconsistent with a soundly accepted the­
ory; hence there is no proper role for ethical and social values, alongside the cog­
nitive values, in making judgments of theory acceptance. In contrast, autonomy is 
not a realizable value; and neutrality—that, overall and in principle, the application 
of scientific knowledge serves value-outlooks evenhandedly—is compromised 
within mainstream scientific practices, but could be more fully manifested if scien­
tific research were conducted under a suitable plurality of methodological ap­
proaches.
The key to my argument lay in introducing, as an element in the analysis of 
scientific methodology, in addition to “theory” (hypothesis) and “empirical 
data,” what I call a “strategy”;
Thesis 3: (a) Scientific research is always conducted under a strategy, whose main 
roles are, first, to prescribe constraints on the kinds of theories (and the kinds of cat­
egories they may deploy) that may be entertained and investigated, and thus to 
specify the kinds of possibilities that may be identified in the course of the research, 
and, second, to select the relevant kinds of empirical data to seek out and report, 
and the phenomena and aspects of them that are to be observed and experimented 
upon, (b) The aim of science permits that successful research may be conducted un­
der a variety of kinds of strategies.
But:
Thesis 4: Modern scientific research has been conducted almost exclusively under 
particular kinds, of strategies (albeit a considerable variety of them), those I call 
“materialist strategies,” under which theories are constrained to those that represent 
phenomena and encapsulate possibilities in terms of their being generable from un­
derlying structure (and its components), process, interaction, and the laws (charac­
teristically expressed mathematically) that govern them; and, by virtue of obtaining 
them as products of measurement, instrumental, and experimental operations, em­
pirical data are generally quantitative.
Representing phenomena under materialist strategies decontextualizes them, by 
dissociating them from any place they may have in relation to social arrange­
ments, human lives and experience, from any link with value, and from what­
ever social, human, and ecological frameworks in which they may be embedded. 
In this book, I call the kinds of possibilities that can be encapsulated under ma­
terialist strategies “decontextualized possibilities” (or, as I called them in SVF, 
“material possibilities”). In order to illustrate that not all possibilities that may
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be identified in systematic empirical inquiry (whose results accord with impar­
tiality) are reducible to decontextualized possibilities, I used the examples of 
human agency and agroecology. Research conducted on human and agroecolog- 
ica! phenomena under respectively “feminist strategies” {SVF, chapter 9) and 
“agroecological strategies” (chapter 8) has produced knowledge in accordance 
with impartiality, but under these strategies phenomena are not dissociated from 
their human/social/ecological contexts, and so the possibilities that are identified 
for them are not decontextualized.
Thesis 5: Scientific research—systematic empirical inquiry that produces results 
that are in accordance with impartiality—may be conducted (for some domains of 
phenomena) under strategies that, while they may freely utilize results consolidated 
under materialist strategies, are not reducible to materialist strategies.
Thesis 5, backed by the illustrations, confirms that including (b) in Thesis 3 is 
not merely an abstract logical point.
Theses 4 and 5, then, lead us to pose the questions; How do we explain the 
fact that modern scientific research has been conducted almost exclusively un­
der materialist strategies? And: Are there good reasons for conducting research 
in this way? After considering and rejecting a variety of answers that have been 
put forward, 1 concluded:
Thesis 6: (a) The almost exclusive adoption of materialist strategies in modern sci­
ence is explained (i) by their fruitfulness and potential for practically unlimited fur­
ther development, (ii) by the fact that there are mutually reinforcing relations be­
tween adopting them and holding a set of social values, specifically the modem 
valuation of control, and (iii) by the fact that the modem valuation of control is 
widely upheld throughout advanced industrial countries and highly embodied in 
their leading institutions, (b) There are good reasons for the privilege that materi­
alist strategies have gained only to the extent that there are good reasons to uphold 
the modern valuation of control.
The modern valuation of control refers to a set of specifically modern values 
connected with the control of natural objects, having to do with expanding the 
scope of technological control, its value not being systematically subordinated 
to that of other ethical and social values, and the degree of its penetration into 
modern lives, experience, and institutions. It and its presuppositions are dis­
cussed more fully in section 1.1. It does not follow from this thesis that materi­
alist strategies are always adopted because of an interest to further the modern 
valuation of control, or that movement from one kind of materialist strategies to 
another can be explained by reference to these social values. Thesis 6 concerns 
the almost exclusive adoption of materialist strategies in modem science, and it 
relates this to particular social values being widely upheld. Item (b) is crucial.
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Where the modem valuation of control is contested, there can be no objection 
(in principle) to adopting strategies in research in virtue of their mutually rein­
forcing relations with other values (subject, of course, to providing reasons to 
uphold these values). Then, we can see Thesis 6 to be a particular case of the 
more general:
Thesis 7: Social values may provide a compelling reason to adopt a particular kind 
of strategy: adopt strategies in view of mutually reinforcing relations that adopting 
them may have with holding specific social values. In practice, this may mean: 
adopt strategies under which valued kinds of possibilities (if there are any) can be 
systematically identified and the means for realizing them discovered, or that have 
the potential to produce results that, on application, can further the interests defined 
by the values—subject always to the conditions of (i) fruitfulness, (ii) the results 
gained being in accord with impartiality, and (iii) the recognition that it is not evi­
dence against the genuineness of a possibility that it cannot be identified under a 
favored strategy.
Feminist values may provide a good reason to adopt “feminist strategies,” and 
the values of “popular participation,” widely held values within movements of 
small-scale farmers and rural workers in many of the impoverished regions of 
the world, may provide a good reason to adopt “agroecological strategies” (see 
section 5.4 and part II of this book). Thesis 7 goes hand in hand with:
Thesis 8: The moment of deciding to adopt a strategy may be logically separated 
from that of choice to accept or reject a theory (of a specified domain of phenom­
ena) constructed under the strategy, so much so that commitment to impartiality can 
be maintained at the latter moment, even though social values may have a legiti­
mate role at the first moment. Moreover, the social values in play at the first mo­
ment may be the same values whose furtherance is served at a third moment, that 
of the application of scientific knowledge.
Theses 7 and 8 together sum up the general model of the interplay of science and 
values that I referred to at the outset.
Research conducted under one kind of strategy may complement that con­
ducted under another by, for example, exploring possibilities of things that can­
not be considered because of the constraints of the other. But strategies may also 
compete (e.g., for resources), and this may make it socially impossible for re­
search to be conducted simultaneously and in a probing way under conflicting 
strategies. Thus, if one kind of strategies is privileged because of its links with 
predominant social values, this may lead to inability even to recognize that there 
is a choice of strategy to make. Specifically:
Thesis 9: So strong is the grip of materialist strategies in modern science that it 
is often not appreciated that there may be certain domains of phenomena (e.g..
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agriculture), which are of special salience where the modern valuation of control 
is contested, but whose possibilities cannot be adequately encapsulated in theo­
ries confirmed in research conducted under materialist strategies, although they 
can be under other kinds of strategies (e.g., agroecological strategies).
With this in mind, I introduced:
Thesis 10: The aim of science is best served by institutionalizing scientific practices 
so that a plurality of strategies, linked respectively with different social values, may 
be actively pursued. This would also make possible the fuller manifestation of neu­
trality and giving better attention to value issues raised by applications, and, above 
all, be conducive to strengthening the institutions of democratic participation.
THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK
Part I
These theses all remain intact in this book, and I will make use of them fre­
quently. Tn chapter 1,1 will recapitulate the arguments in favor of them, clarify 
them in various ways, emphasize how they are illustrated by the competition be­
tween agroecological and materialist strategies, and anticipate the conclusions of 
later chapters. The other chapters of part I provide arguments complementing 
those of SVF and draw further implications from the theses concerning both how 
to understand and how to conduct scientific practices. In chapter 2,1 will show 
that there need not be conflict between the traditional ideal of scientific objec­
tivity and the conduct of scientific inquiry for the sake of furthering social Jus­
tice and human well-being. In chapter 3,1 address a gap in the argument of SVF. 
My defense of impartiality, which draws on the presupposition that there is a sig­
nificant distinction between cognitive and social (ethical and other kinds oO val­
ues, has been criticized. In this chapter 1 offer a sustained defense of the impor­
tance of the distinction. In the course of doing so, new insights arise about 
important methodological issues connected with applications of scientific 
knowledge. Distinguishing between the efficacy and legitimacy of proposed ap­
plications, and reinforcing the importance of Thesis 10,1 show that legitimacy 
depends on endorsing hypotheses (e.g., about risks to human health and the en­
vironment, and about the availability of alternative efficacious means to realize 
the objective of the application) that lie beyond the purview of research con­
ducted under materialist strategies. The significance of this conclusion is made 
apparent throughout part II.
In chapter 4 and chapter 5 I explore more fully the implications of the plural­
ism that I have proposed. What is the range and variety of strategies that could 
or should be developed? I do not attempt to answer this question fully; to do so
Introduction 1
would require a vast number of case studies in fields like psychology, medicine, 
and energy policy. I do suggest in chapter 4, however, drawing upon the case 
study of agriculture, that a wide range of cultural values may legitimately have 
impact on the kinds of strategies that one adopts, so that there are legitimate cul­
ture-based variations in approaches to scientific practices. Then, in chapter 5, de­
veloping this argument and making use of a detailed account of agroecological 
strategies, I consolidate the conclusion that there are rich dialectical links be­
tween methodology and application, so much so that it is often impossible to 
separate the interpretation of scientific results from the social location in which 
the research is conducted. From this, it follows that scientific practices exhibit 
historicity: that their character changes, and must change, in fundamental ways 
that arise historically, through being responsive to and shaped significantly by 
historical and cultural variations in the realm of daily life and experience and in 
the structures of social practice.
The arguments I make in part I—for strategic pluralism, for there being (of­
ten and legitimately) mutually reinforcing relations between adopting strategies 
and holding particular social values, and for the historicity and sociocultural 
shaping of scientific practices—are arguments in the philosophy of science. 
They draw principally upon my statement of the aim of science (section 3.2) and 
my exploration of how to further the manifestation of the widely acclaimed sci­
entific ideals of impartiality and neutrality. In order to show that this plurality 
represents more than an abstract possibility (Thesis 5), I introduced the case of 
agroecological strategies (detailed in section 5.4) as a concrete illustration. 
Agroecological strategies are not reducible to materialist strategies, and adopt­
ing them has mutually reinforcing relations with holding the values of popular 
participation (characterized in section 6.3). The soundness of the argument in 
part I does not depend on holding any particular ethical/social values (apart from 
those implicit in the aim of science). My highlighting of agroecological strate­
gies does reflect my own commitment to the values of popular participation. 
This commitment, however, is irrelevant to the appraisal of the fruitfulness of 
these strategies; and also the facts that they are not reducible to materialist strate­
gies, and that these values contest the modem valuation of control, are irrelevant 
to this appraisal.
In part I, the role of agroecological strategies is to provide an example that 
shows that there are actual instances of what philosophical analysis identifies to 
be possible (a plurality of fmitful strategies). Other strategies, for example, in 
the psychological, social, or medical sciences, could have played this role just as 
well. In part II, the role of agroecological strategies is essential; knowledge 
gained in investigations conducted under them is indispensable for making im­
portant ethical judgments about the legitimacy of using transgenics; and devel­
opment of the farming practices that agroecological knowledge informs is im­
portant for the consolidation of democratic ideals.
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Part II
In part II, drawing on the conclusions of part I, I offer an interpretation of current 
controversy about transgenic crops and alternative types of farming such as 
agroecology. The controversy is about the legitimacy of research, development, 
practical agricultural implementation of transgenics, and practices and policies 
(pertaining to transgenics) that currently are being implemented under the spon­
sorship principally of agribusiness corporations. I take the pro-transgenics side to 
argue for the legitimacy (and importance) of the development, immediate imple­
mentation, intensive utilization, and widespread diffusion of transgenics in the 
agricultural practices that produce major crops, throughout the world as soon as 
possible, and for support for transgenics to become a central plank in national and 
international agricultural policies. And I take the con side to deny that the pro 
conclusions have been adequately established; to maintain that more research is 
needed before a definitive position can be taken; and positively, to prioritize al­
ternatives that do not use transgenics, such as agroecology, and the urgency and 
priority of investigating their productive potentials.
My interpretation identifies the principal points of contention (while recog­
nizing, since there is a variety of opinions in play on both sides, that it involves 
a certain amount of idealization). This is a prerequisite to exploring what would 
have to be done (if anything can be) to bring about—or to show that there are 
insuperable obstacles to bringing about—a resolution of the dispute. It involves 
two steps: first, identifying four pairs of contrary propositions that are in dispute 
(section 6.2)—pro: P1-P4 and con: Ci-C^; and, second, sketching the value- 
outlooks that are implicated, respectively, in the two positions (section 6.3). The 
propositions are about strategies for research in agricultural science (discussed 
in detail in chapter 7), benefits (chapter 8) and risks of using transgenics (chap­
ter 9), and whether there are better alternatives (chapter 10):
Strategies for Research in Agricultural Science
Pi Developments of transgenics are informed in an exemplary way by scientific 
knowledge, that is, they are informed by knowledge gained in research con­
ducted under appropriate versions (biotechnological) of materialist strategies; 
they are instances of techno-scientific developments, which are the principal 
sources of improvements of agricultural practices and (more generally) meet­
ing human needs.
C| The kind of knowledge gained under materialist strategies is incomplete and 
cannot encompass the possibilities of, for example, sustainable agroecosys­
tems and the possible effects of uses of transgenics on the environment, peo­
ple, and social arrangements; it is necessary to adopt other strategies in order 
to investigate these matters.
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Benefits of Using Transgenics
There are great benefits to be had from using TGs now, and these benefits will 
greatly expand with future developments, among which are promised TG 
crops with enhanced nutritional qualities that can readily be grown in poor de­
veloping countries so that TGs may become key to addressing problems like 
those of hunger and malnutrition. When these promises are fulfilled, the ben­
efits of TGs will become spread evenhandedly so as (in principle) to serve the 
interests and to improve the farming practices of groups holding any viable 
value-outlooks.
C2The benefits claimed for currently used TGs reflect the ethical/social values 
of agribusiness, large-scale farmers, and others who are beneficiaries of the 
global market. Furthermore, not only are the benefits relatively slight (per­
haps even exaggerated by the proponents), being confined largely to these 
groups and not extending to small-scale farmers in the “developing” world (or 
to organic farmers in the advanced industrial societies), but also the promises 
made about future benefits are not credible, in part because developments of 
TGs reflect the interests of the global-market system, the very same system 
within which poverty, the fundamental cause of hunger and malnutrition, per­
sists today.
Risks of the Development and Use of Transgenics
P3 There are no hazards to human health or the environment arising from the cur­
rent and anticipated uses of transgenic crops and their products that pose 
risks—of seriousness, magnitude, and probability of occurrence sufficient to 
cancel the alleged value of their benefits—that cannot be adequately managed 
under responsibly designed regulations.
Cj This claim about risks is not well established scientifically. Moreover, the 
greatest risks may not be direct ones to human health and the environment 
mediated by biological mechanisms, but those occasioned by the socio­
economic context of the research and development of transgenics and their as­
sociated mechanisms, such as designating that transgenic seeds are objects to 
which intellectual property rights may be granted.
Alternative (or "Better") Forms of Farming
P4 There are no alternative kinds of farming that could be deployed instead of 
the proposed transgenic-oriented ways without occasioning unacceptable 
risks (e.g., not producing enough food to feed and nourish the world’s grow­
ing population), and that reasonably could be expected to produce greater 
benefits concerning productivity, sustainability, and meeting human needs— 
“transgenics are necessary to feed the world.”
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C4 Agroecological methods (and other alternatives) can be and are being devel­
oped that enable high productivity of essential crops (and occasion relatively 
less risk); and they promote sustainable agroecosystems, utilize and protect 
biodiversity, and contribute to the social emancipation of poor communities. 
Furthermore, there is good evidence that they are particularly well suited to 
ensure that rural populations in “developing” countries are well fed and nour­
ished, so that without their further development current patterns of hunger are 
likely to continue.
By identifying these as the key points of contention, I hope to have interpreted 
the dispute so that a perspicuous contrast is made between the two sides, one that 
meets the following conditions: (i) each side can acknowledge that its position 
has been fairly represented; (ii) each side is enabled to recognize the internal co­
herence of the other, to identify clearly what lies behind the disagreements, and 
to raise questions about the evidence and arguments that support the various 
propositions; (iii) avenues that might lead to resolution, which are in continuity 
with the basic commitments of each side, become opened for exploration.
Iniplications of the Interpretation
Although 1 think that my interpretation meets these conditions, this does not 
mean that 1 abstain from taking positions on the propositions. There is good 
reason —1 will argue, again with grounding in the conclusions of part I—to en­
dorse C| (methodological pluralism) (chapter 7), that now and lack the 
support that they need in order to play their role in arguments legitimating uses 
of transgenics (chapter 9 and chapter 10, respectively), and that there is ur­
gency to conduct research relevant to test the limits of the promise of alterna­
tive agricultural methods, expressed in (chapter 10). That is enough to deny 
legitimacy at the present time to projects aimed at the widespread implemen­
tation of transgenic-oriented agriculture throughout the world. But it also is 
part of my argument that the legitimacy of the transgenics project in the long 
run depends on the outcomes of testing the limits of (section 10.4), so that 
using my interpretive framework does not guarantee that the opponents of 
transgenics will be vindicated in the long run.
The interpretive framework sets up a context in which empirical investigation, 
conducted under a plurality of strategies (including agroecological ones), could 
play a major role in cutting through the disagreements about risks (P3/C3) and al­
ternative types of farming (PyC^). Conducting this kind of research would in­
form ethical deliberation in two ways, by providing knowledge (a) for apprais­
ing presuppositions of the legitimacy of using transgenics on a wide scale at the 
present time, and (b) for informing agroecological innovations that are impor­
tant for bringing about greater manifestation of the values of popular participa­
tion. Thus, engaging in research conducted under agroecological strategies is
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likely, because of (a), to further the manifestation of impartiality and, because of 
(b), of neutrality; and so, adopting strategies, which have mutually reinforcing 
relations with the values of popular participation, is likely to contribute to the 
furtherance of acclaimed scientific interests. According to my interpretation, the 
con argument is not an abstract one, and it does not involve merely negative crit­
icism of mainstream science, since it is also rooted in critical reflection on the 
practices of agroecology. It enables a positive case to be made for the scientific 
significance of the knowledge that informs agroecological practices and for the 
value of research that strengthens them. It is part of a philosophical perspective 
that interprets and supports both the practices and the research conducted to in­
form them (as having a proper place—alongside others—within scientific prac­
tices), and it defends their credentials from criticisms that they are “unscien­
tific.” So it is an interpretation that confronts the predominant self-image of 
contemporary science with the sound claims of an alternative practice. The 
strength of the argument goes hand in hand with the value and viability of the 
alternative practices.
Does the Authority of Science Provide 
Backing for the Pro Transgenics Side?
I said that I wanted an interpretation in which each side would acknowledge the 
portrayal made of it. I have taken seriously the pro side’s claim to have the 
backing of science. Obviously developments of transgenics are products of re­
search conducted under materialist (biotechnological, molecular biological) 
strategies, and their efficacy (within certain domains) has been confirmed by 
this research. In addition, I take the pro side to claim scientific backing for the 
key propositions about risks and alternatives that are important for legitimating 
uses of transgenics. I argue (chapter 9; chapter 10) that at the present time there 
is not strong empirical backing for P, and P^, since relevant inquiries (that I 
specify)—requiring the use of a plurality of strategies—pertaining to risk have 
not been conducted, and others pertaining to alternatives have effectively been 
ignored. But, by endorsing P,, the pro side tends to identify scientific research 
with research conducted under materialist strategies, and so it does not recog­
nize the possibility (and, in this case, necessity) of scientific research con­
ducted under a plurality of strategies. (Thus, it tends to interpret the con side as 
“unscientific” or even “antiscientific.”) I will suggest that endorsing Pj is a 
consequence of holding the modern valuation of control and endorsing its pre­
suppositions (section 9.2); then the absence of strong empirical backing for P^ 
and P^ (and accepting that there is a strong presumption in their favor) derives, 
not from scientific evidence, but in part from a value commitment, that has pre­
suppositions (e.g., that techno-scientific solutions can be found for virtually all 
socially significant problems, and that there are no significant possibilities for 
value-outlooks, not incorporating the modern valuation of control, to be actu-
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alized in the foreseeable future—section 1.1) that themselves cannot be inves­
tigated under materialist strategies.
At the same time as the pro side claims the backing of the authority of science, 
it also represents the interests of leading institutions of capital and the market 
that dominate the world economy today. Another way to look at its endorsement 
of P|, and its endorsement of the presuppositions of the modern valuation of con­
trol, is that they derive from endorsing that there are no significant (valued) pos­
sibilities for the foreseeable future outside of the trajectory of the institutions of 
capital and the market. Then (section 10.6), the pro argument could be strength­
ened, since it would appear to marginalize the relevance of Cj and C^, by re­
placing with P^a:
P^a; There are no alternative kinds of farming—wit/im the trajectory of the 
socioeconomic system based on capital and the market—that could be de­
ployed instead of the proposed TG-oriented ways without occasioning unac­
ceptable risks (e.g., not producing enough food to feed and nourish the 
world’s growing population), and that reasonably could be expected to pro­
duce greater benefits concerning productivity, sustainability, and meeting hu­
man needs; and outside of this trajectory there are no genuinely realizable 
agricultural possibilities.
P^a may be taken to express a political-economic commitment and, given the 
constraints it states, empirical research might contribute to vindicate it; and, 
given the economic and political power linked with it, it might be expedient sim­
ply to dismiss the con side as a nuisance. Then the authority of science would be 
subordinated to the political values and power embodied in this trajectory. Al­
ternatively, the pro side might claim to endorse P^a on empirical grounds and, in 
this way, to reclaim the authority of science. Clearly the con side would oppose 
it on both counts.
Part III
In the public debates about transgenics, the pro side often moves imperceptibly 
back and forth between P^ and P^a. Responding to P^, the con side emphasizes 
the fruitfulness of research conducted under agroecological strategies and the 
promise of agroecological approaches to farming; responding to P^a, it affirms 
the viability of the movements that embody the values of popular participation 
and their potential to grow with a trajectory that could nurture new kinds of so­
cial structures. Thus, for the con side, the development of research conducted 
under agroecological strategies, the development and improvement of agroeco­
logical farming, and the activities and growth of movements that embody the 
values of popular participation are inseparably linked.
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These considerations all raise the question of how propositions like P^a, the 
presuppositions of the modem valuation of control, and other questions about 
future social possibilities—as well as the various contrary propositions that 
would be affirmed by the con side—can be investigated in a systematic empiri­
cal way. Under what kinds of (social science) strategies would the investigations 
have to be conducted? The answer to this question, and the outcomes of the re­
search, are relevant to attempts to resolve the controversies about transgenics in 
ways that make use of the input of scientific (systematic empirical) investigation 
to the utmost. Those with power on their side have not waited for an answer be­
fore going ahead with the rapid and widespread introduction of transgenics; con­
sequently the con side often finds itself in a negative reactive mode, opposing 
what is happening. That should not obscure the continuing importance of inves­
tigating further the promise contained in C^. Evidence for directly challenges 
the empirical credentials of P^, but it also remains important that there be move­
ments that challenge P^a. The possibility of manifesting values like those of pop­
ular participation to a greater degree depends on there being genuine alternative 
practices (in agriculture as well as other areas) that may reflect these values, and 
the latter depends on social and political action that claims and gains more and 
expanding spaces for these practices, expansion that is not possible without suc­
cessfully challenging P^a.
In the brief part III, I begin to entertain questions about how to investigate fu­
ture social possibilities. I do just enough to make clear that the conclusions of 
part I, especially those about strategic pluralism and mutually reinforcing rela­
tions between adopting strategies and holding values, will play an important role 
in answering them. I can do no more than this within the scope of this book.
